The United
States can still choose to avoid an arms race, and it should make this choice
because its security interests can be better served through other means—even in
a world where the combined number of Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons aimed
at our homeland is greater than our deployed forces by a factor of two. Nuclear
deterrence, after all, does not demand nuclear superiority; the compulsion felt among many in
Washington to build up is a product, instead, of how the United States has done
nuclear strategy since the 1960s.
There are
other ways forward, and the American people should ask the experts, thinkers,
and leaders who work through these issues to consider these better alternatives.
For instance, one solution might be found today with non-nuclear technologies
and weapons. Missiles armed with conventional warheads have grown so precise
and capable that, for years, Russian and Chinese experts have been concerned
that such capabilities could degrade their nuclear forces. As Sullivan
suggested in June, one answer for the United States could be offsetting any new
perceived nuclear “gap” with upgraded conventional weapons that might be fit
for purpose.
Another
solution may be found through a wholesale rethink of how the United States
implements its strategy of nuclear deterrence. Beginning in the 1960s, the
United States moved toward a strategy that privileges the limitation of damage
against its homeland in a nuclear war. While this may sound like a laudable
objective, it was in no small part responsible for contributing to arms-racing
dynamics during the Cold War and even heightening the risk of unwanted nuclear
war in a serious crisis.